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Marine Genetic Resources Beyond 
National Jurisdiction:
Elements of a New International Legally Binding Instrument
This note is intended to inform country representatives, negotiators, and legal and technical 
advisers of springboards and roadblocks to an acceptable international legally binding 
instrument on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction under UNGA resolution 69/292.1
1 UNGA 69/292 (6 July 2015) Development of an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. Available here <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N15/187/55/PDF/N1518755.pdf?OpenElement> This note is a response to the Mare Geneticum framework discussed at Aberdeen University, 
June 27–28 2018. A Broggiato et al., ‘Mare Geneticum: Balancing the Governance of Marine Genetic Resources in International Waters’ 2017. Available 
here http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15718085-13310030 
2 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215356
3 M Bourrel, T Thiele, D Currie ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Means to Assess And Advance Equity in Deep Sea Mining’ Marine Policy 2016. 
Available here <http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/publications/2017/common-of-heritage-of-mankind-deep-sea-mining.pdf>
4 The European Union is for instance, proposing a pragmatic approach that does not discuss this legal base. Development of an International Legally Binding 
Instrument under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Process): 
EU and Member States Position Paper 22 Feb 2017. Available here http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/rolling_comp/EU_Written_
Submission_on_Marine_Genetic_Resources.pdf
B iodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdictions (ABNJ) is the last global commons, and technological developments mean that it is ripe for harvesting. The principle of freedom of the 
seas, and the freedom of states to conduct scientific 
research under the UN Convention of the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), makes the need for a global governance 
regime that is fair, informed and progressive an urgent 
one. This briefing note is based on a full paper available 
on SSRN.2
1. Common Heritage of Humanity
The central issue for any new international legally binding 
legal instrument on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction 
(BBNJ) is the normative basis of the instrument that can 
guide scope of application, interpretation and enforcement. 
While ‘mineral resources’, covered in Part XI of UNCLOS, 
do not include marine genetic resources (MGR) and 
the area of the deep-sea floor, it can be argued that its 
ecosystems, biodiversity and thus MGR are within the 
purview of the common heritage of humanity principle 
(CHH), though various parties have chosen not to pursue 
this legal debate.3
 There are three possible approaches: 
1. MGR in areas beyond national jurisdictions can be 
subjected to the principle of common heritage of 
humanity either as communal ownership or as joint 
management of global commons.
2. MGR is not subjected to the principle of CHH. 
3. The issue of what to do with MGR outside territorial 
waters is not addressed.4
No treaty can account for all aspects of an emerging 
technological area without a jurisprudential basis. To 
allow for principled growth of legal rules and avoid a 
normatively incoherent approach, CHH must apply to 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdictions in 
some form.
Resolve: Whether the common heritage of humanity 
principle applies to the ownership of biodiversity including 
marine genetic resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction or only (or at least) to a joint management 
regime over global commons of which marine genetic 
resources are a part.
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2. The Legal Status of Access
Any binding international legal instrument must recognise 
and define ‘access’ to marine genetic resources beyond 
national jurisdiction and imbue the act with any rights 
and obligations of benefit-sharing that attach under the 
instrument. Access is the pivotal act which ignites the value 
chain of that genetic resource, and also identifies where 
a particular resource has been acquired. Without access 
there cannot be utilisation, including commercialisation. 
In order to exercise due diligence in acquisition of 
genetic resources, access would have to be traceable 
in some form, at least to prove that it was not acquired 
in territorial waters and is not under the purview of the 
Nagoya Protocol.5 It is also important to move away 
from the loopholes and structural problems related to 
implementation and access to ex situ collections6 that 
follow from the ambiguity in the Nagoya Protocol with 
respect to access and utilisation.7 
Resolve: Any binding international instrument must 
recognise and define ‘access’ to marine genetic resources 
of areas national jurisdiction and specify the rights and 
obligations of benefit-sharing in relation to access as 
well as use.
3.The Access Gap
A recent study has detailed how 98 per cent of 1,600 
gene sequences associated with species found in 
deep-sea and hydrothermal vents are owned by actors 
located or headquartered in only 10 countries.8 In terms 
of negotiations, the inability of he vast majority of 
countries to engage in deep-sea expeditions is likely to be 
accompanied by a fear of losing out on bio-scientific and 
commercial gains. There is much in the recent history of 
biotechnology that justifies this fear – including private 
appropriation of human genetic resources through patents 
despite the UNESCO Declaration denoting the human 
5	 The	Nagoya	Protocol,	a	supplementary	instrument	of	international	law	under	the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD),	does	not	define	access,	but	
allows	it	to	be	treated	differently	from	utilisation	of	genetic	resources.	Under	EUR	511/2014	implementing	it,	benefit-sharing	obligations	are	triggered	by	
use rather than access 
6 F Rabitz, ‘Biopiracy after the Nagoya Protocol: Problem Structure, Regime Design and Implementation Challenges’ J of the Brazilian Political Science 
Organization 2015 9 (2) 30-53.  Available here http://www.scielo.br/pdf/bpsr/v9n2/1981-3821:bpsr-9-2-0030.pdf
7 ‘The Two Worlds of Nagoya: ABS Legislation in the EU and Provider Countries: Discrepancies and How to Deal with Them’ Natural Justice/Public Eye Report 
Dec 2016
8 R Blasiak et al., ‘Corporate Control and Global Governance of Marine Genetic Resources’ Science Advances 6 June 2018. Available here http://advances.
sciencemag.org/content/4/6/eaar5237	Also	see	National	Institute	of	Genetics	(2015).	Access	to	Marine	Genetic	Resources	and	Benefit-sharing	from	
Their Academic Use, Report of MGR Workshop in Japan (edited by H Morioka), Tokyo, available from http://nig-chizai.sakura.ne.jp/abs_tft/wpcontent/
uploads/2016/08/Marine-genetic-resources.pdf as cited in Carlos Correa, Access to and Benefit-Sharing of Marine Genetic Resources Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: Developing a New Legally Binding Instrument South Centre Research Paper 79 (September 2017) p 6
9	 1997	UNESCO	Universal	Declaration	on	the	Human	Genome	and	Human	Rights.	See	LS	Cahill,	‘Genetics,	Commodification,	and	Social	Justice	in	the	
Globalization Era’ 2001 Kennedy Inst of Ethics J 11 (3) 221-38 Available here https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11700680
10	 Referred	to	as	a	first-come-first-served	rule	under	the	principle	of	freedom	in	the	high	seas	in	the	National	Institute	of	Genetics	(2015)	report	n	8	above
11 See discussion in C Correa South Centre Report n 8 above
genome as common heritage of humanity.9 It is because 
of the reality of and likely entrenched nature of technical 
barriers that the legal status of access of MGR becomes 
paramount. If we do not imbue the act of access with 
legal status to which obligations are attached, it would 
amount to little more than a technical and scientific 
might is right10 approach when it comes to appropriating 
marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdictions. 
Resolve: Technical barriers and the access gap should 
not be allowed to downplay the commercial and technical 
prospects of marine genetic resources accessed from 
areas beyond national jurisdictions. As long as some can 
access such marine genetic resources, the communal 
nature of such resources remains under threat.
4. Notification/Registration or 
Authorisation
Art 138 of UNCLOS requires international cooperation 
and mutual understanding. Currently due to the principle 
of freedom of the high seas it is legal to access marine 
genetic resources, and there are indications that research 
activity on the high seas is ongoing.11 Registration of who 
is accessing biodiversity will facilitate co-operation and 
mutual understanding of how marine genetic resources 
are being handled. Such registration could involve either 
‘notification’ or a more consequential ‘authorisation’ regime. 
A notification approach would require researchers to 
inform a transnational authority of intention to conduct 
sampling expeditions.
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Although there would be no authority to prevent scientific 
exploration,12 there are multiple advantages of such a 
registration system: 
1. To enable ‘conservation and sustainable use’ under 
UNGA resolution 69/292 
2. To enable and ensure possibility of benefit-sharing. 
3. Facilitate due diligence and corporate social 
responsibility with respect to sampling and use 
of resources. Here it is worth noting that agreeing 
on the CHH principle would strengthen the basis 
of social responsibility by corporations and other 
entities. 
Realistically, a notification regime would be easier 
to achieve than an authorisation framework, as the 
latter would need to invest authority in an international 
organisation, which would administer or hand out the 
authorisations based on certain prior agreed conditions. 
Resolve: Registering scientific expeditions on the high 
seas either through notification or authorisation is a 
necessary, although not sufficient, component of the 
management of biodiversity in areas beyond national 
jurisdictions.
5. Binaries of Commercial/Non-
Commercial and Academic/non-
Academic
Traditionally, academic research has been associated with 
non-commercial activity and has benefited from certain 
privileges.13 In recent years, the boundaries between 
academic and commercial research have become blurred14 
and the association of academic with non-commercial 
activity no longer reflects reality. 
12	 Arts	256	and	257	of	UNCLOS	give	all	states	the	‘right	to	conduct	marine	scientific	research’.
13 Through, for instance, the protocol’s recommendation to promote non-commercial research in Art 8 and Mare Geneticum framework n 1 above p 17
14 See, for instance, M Haas & S Park, ‘To Share or Not to Share? Professional Norms, Reference Groups, and Information Withholding Among Life Scientists’ 
2010 Organization Science, 21 (4), 873-891
15 R Eisenberg and M Heller, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Innovation’ Science 280 (5364) May 1 1998 pp. 698-701
16 See, for instance, HGS v Eli Lilly [2011] UKSC 51, Global Status and Trends in Intellectual Property Claims: Genomics, Proteomics and Biotechnology UNEP/
CBD/WG-ABS/3/INF/411 January 2005, S Thambisetty ‘Learning Needs of the Patent System and Emerging Technologies: A Focus on Synthetic Biology 
(2014) IPQ 13
17 M Lemley and C Shapiro, ‘Probabilistic Patents’ 19(2) J of Econ Perspectives 75-98 (2005)
18 Encouraging more SMEs to patent is one of the stated aims of the push to establish the Unitary Patent Court in Europe https://www.epo.org/news-issues/
news/2018/20180416b.html
19 S Thambisetty, ‘Patents as Credence Goods’ 2007 Oxford J of Legal Stud 27(4) 707-740
20 R Merges, ‘A New Dynamism in the Public Domain’ 2004 (71) Uni of Chi LR 183-203
21 Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. J Duffy ‘Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law’ 2002 Faculty Publications. Paper 849. http://
scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/849;	see	also	P	Drahos,	‘Trust	Me:	Patent	Offices	in	Developing	Countries’	American Journal of Law and Medicine 2008 
(34) 151-174
Most universities now insist on patents being sought 
for research results across the board, even prioritising 
patents over possible publications.15 Patent law facilitates 
this by operating low thresholds for inventions including 
for those derived bioinformatically.16 Any analyses of 
patents as an indication of commercial activity could 
also be misleading for many different reasons. While 
no one ought to take a patent as a definite commercial 
prospect, everyone knows it is a good signal of probable 
value;17 conversely, the lack of a patent does not indicate 
solely non-commercial motives. 18 
Researchers often move between universities and the 
commercial sector.19 We also see corporations populating 
and maintaining public repositories or libraries of genetic 
information. The giving away of information can pre-
empt appropriation from competitors or move the level 
of innovation forward, benefiting the long-term interest 
of the commercial entities concerned.20 
Resolve: Labels such as academic/non-commercial, 
and commercial/non-academic must not be used to 
justify good faith advantages. All research entities are 
a complex mix of self and public interest in different 
proportion, expressed through a range of measures 
such as publications and patents. Focus instead on and 
reward the nature of the research, ability and explicit 
intention to participate in open-science initiatives and 
academic norms of sharing.
6. Patents and MGR in Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdictions
Most of the world has signed up to the TRIPS agreement, 
under which countries are obligated to implement national 
patent laws at a high level of harmonisation.21
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Most jurisdictions allow patents on genetic material and 
data. This includes material developed from biodiversity 
samples taken from the high seas. Under the isolation test 
in patent law, genetic material may be patented simply 
by being accessed, characterised and otherwise made 
available in a form that does not exist in nature. This 
is a low novelty threshold and makes genetic material 
open to patents widely.22 
The amount of genetic data available online and in 
repositories makes it difficult for patent examiners to 
verify novelty.23 Hence genetic material in the public 
domain can provide private entities with an enormous 
competitive and commercial advantage and end up 
being patented. Moreover, location of a gene sequence 
within a gene bank in the absence of a known probe is 
in fact regarded as a biochemical process, similar to 
the isolation of a component from nature that lends 
patentability to gene sequences.24 
There are indications that commercial entities are 
patenting marine genetic resources from areas beyond 
national borders in substantial numbers.25 Scientific 
innovations including pharmaceuticals developed from 
these patented genetic resources will almost certainly 
be inaccessible to poorer populations. Privately owned 
patents on genetic material and information, in the 
absence of overarching legally binding principles, are 
not compatible with the idea of good governance of 
MGR from areas beyond national jurisdiction in the best 
interests of all mankind. It is true that an international 
forum such as the WIPO is more specialised but due to a 
phenomenon called ‘regime shifting’ in the international 
intellectual property system, the terms in which patents 
and other intellectual property rights are referenced in 
the biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions (BBNJ) 
process can have a robust impact on how this issue is 
taken up at the WIPO.26 
22 The US Supreme Court in AMP v Myriad 569 US 576 disallowed patents on genomic DNA, but allowed claims on cDNA, which is exceptionally easy to 
derive from genomic DNA. The decision does not therefore amount to a dramatic change in how business around genetic material is conducted. 
S Thambisetty, ‘Alice and Something More: The Drift Towards European Patent Jurisprudence’ 2016 J Law and Bioscience 691-696 and also see similar 
decision in D’Arch v Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35
23 See O Jefferson et al., ‘Public Disclosure of Biological Sequences in Global Patent Practice’ 2015 World Patent Information https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
wpi.2015.08.005
24 P Cole, ‘Patentability of Genes: A European Union Perspective’ Cold Spring Harb Perspect Med 2015 May 5(5)
25 R Blasiak et al., n 8 above
26 L Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System’ Perspectives on Politics 7(1) 39-44 
27 Ad Hoc Technical Group (AHTEG) on Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources serving the needs of the Nagoya Protocol under the CBD. https://
www.cbd.int/abs/dsi-gr/ahteg.shtml
28	 Such	as	the	Obligatory	Prior	Electronic	Notification	(OPEN)	in	Mare Geneticum framework n 1 above
29 Although a few countries have done so already, the Nagoya Protocol does not institute a declaration of origin for all genetic resources in patent 
applications. In the following list not all of the requirements are in prejudice to the processing of patent applications or right granted http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf
Resolve: The BBNJ process needs to address the question 
of intellectual property rights. It needs to recognise that 
the acquisition of privately owned patents is already 
possible and that this is potentially incompatible with 
the fair, equitable and sustainable use of marine genetic 
resources from areas beyond national jurisdiction. Only 
by allowing genetic resources to be identified as such can 
the relevance of biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions 
be maintained. 
7. Track and Trace: Scientific and 
Legal Imperative
Track	and	trace	attached	to	notification	or	authorisation	is	
necessary	to	enable	scientific	accountability	as	well	as	to	
actualise	any	forthcoming	benefit-sharing.	Without	such	
track and trace there would be no way to link any future 
actions related to MGR to conservation, sustainable use 
or	benefit-sharing.
First and foremost, any track and trace system must resolve 
the position of ex situ and in silico27 genetic resources.28 Not 
to do so runs the risk of making this treaty obsolete even 
before it begins. Track and trace for MGR beyond national 
jurisdiction is likely necessitated by the implementation of 
the Nagoya Protocol. In fact – at least within the European 
Union – due diligence requirements mean that collections 
ought to obtain and keep information about the provenance 
of material and data they hold. 
Secondly, any track and trace system should interact with 
the patent system. Intellectual property rights amount to 
legal track and trace.29 In order to make any sort of monetary 
benefit-sharing	possible,	unless	provenance	of	the	genetic	
resource	can	be	identified	in	the	patent,	there	is	no	way	
to	enforce	or	monitor	benefit-sharing.	This	will	pave	the	
way for contractual avoidance in individual transactions 
or contracts, which currently is of acute concern under 
the Nagoya Protocol.
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This problem can be sidestepped in the BBNJ process 
by hooking the question of provenance to the patent 
system. This will bolster the structural weakness related 
to the ambiguity of using bilateral contracts to enforce 
normative objectives of international law.30 Such a 
declaration on provenance is not an onerous process, 
and can potentially be absorbed in the bibliographic 
information routinely submitted as part of the patent 
examination process. Given the logical need it fulfils, 
and the ease with which it can potentially be instituted, 
the only reason not to implement this measure is to 
deny any possibility of monetary benefits being shared. 
Resolve: Any track and trace method must be both 
technical and legal. Declaration of provenance of marine 
genetic resources (whether in situ, ex situ and in silico) 
from areas beyond national jurisdiction is essential to 
ensure monetary benefit-sharing. If the BBNJ process 
does not explicitly refer to patent rights, it will not be able 
to ensure fair and sustainable use of a global commons.
8. Embargoes and Exclusivity
It has been suggested that any researcher who accesses 
MGR beyond national jurisdictions must be entitled to 
a period of embargo over the results of that sampling 
exercise.31 During this period there would be no obligation 
to publish information on what was sampled, allowing 
the researchers to work on either publications or 
patents without fear of being gazumped. It protects the 
investment of time, effort and money, which could be 
seen as desirable to incentivise researchers.
A note of caution and explanation is warranted here. If 
research expeditions are resource and technology intensive, 
then the very fact that the samples were acquired and 
are in the possession of the research crew provides an 
invaluable lead-mover advantage that would be difficult 
to overcome. An embargo will entrench the lead-mover 
advantage, enabling extraction of value both through 
publications and patents without fear of competition, 
functioning essentially like an intellectual property right. 
There is often a chain-reaction dynamic associated 
with property – property begets property. Introducing 
30 T R Young and M W Tvedt, Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-Sharing Contracts (Brill/Nijhoff 2017) p 468
31 The Mare Geneticum framework suggests that the period could be extended with an exclusivity fee: n 1 above
32 S Safrin, ‘Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property’ 2007 (82) Notre Dame Law Rev 1917  
33  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2652775/
34	 E	Morgera,	‘An	International	Legal	Concept	of	Fair	and	Equitable	Benefit-Sharing’	University	of	Edinburgh	School	of	Law	Research	Paper	Series 
No 2015/20 at p 3
35	 According	to	some	reports,	China	has	refused	to	participate	in	monetary	benefit-sharing	as	they	already	expect	to	be	net	providers	rather	than	net	
recipients (Aberdeen Workshop discussion, n 1 above)
new property or property-like rights in a hitherto un-
propertised environment often leads to demands for 
second-generation property rights that do not have 
anything to do with efficiency calculations. The lead 
movers can play an underestimated role in triggering 
this increased propertisation.32 
Resolve: Embargoes and exclusivity models should only 
be used where absolutely necessary, particularly where 
they compete with open-access intent. In the case of 
marine prospecting on the high seas, there is a danger 
of entrenching lead movers: the most technologically 
proficient developed countries and wealthy corporations. 
Existing technical barriers to entry mean that there should 
be no need for such embargoes. 
9. The Malleable Nature of Benefit-
sharing
Despite its recurrent nature and its use in medical 
and genetic research, international law and political 
philosophy benefit-sharing as a legal concept has never 
been satisfactorily defined.33 Growing empirical evidence 
suggests that in practice ‘benefit-sharing rarely achieves 
its stated objectives, and may actually end up working 
against its purposes’ and is seen as a ‘disingenuous win-
win rhetoric’ that leads to loss of control and access over 
resources.34 References to non-monetary and monetary 
benefit-sharing in a new BBNJ treaty process should 
use international biodiversity law as a point of departure 
rather than a reference. 
While it will not guarantee it, monetary benefit-sharing 
is virtually impossible without a formal link between any 
international legally binding treaty and the international 
patent system. Conversely, it would be good to acknowledge 
directly that one of the main reasons not to make such a 
link effective is to escape the burden of having to share 
monetary benefits.35 
The	problem	with	non-monetary	benefit-sharing	is	that	
since	it	is	almost	always	qualitatively	defined,	it	cannot	be	
measured, or monitored against benchmarks. Non-monetary 
benefits	are	often	couched	in	terms	of	global	goods	–	
progress of science, making knowledge available, etc.
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However, like technology transfer,36 such amorphous 
benefits remain platitudinous in the absence of requisite 
technical skill in local or regional communities. 
In terms of benefit-sharing, as ‘local’ communities do not 
exist in the ABNJ context, the process must establish a 
new concept of regional stewardship. In terms of non-
monetary benefits, the establishment of linked technical 
universities to be housed in the southern hemisphere, 
funded by contribution funds and capable of improving 
capacity for marine prospecting, would be meaningful.
Resolve: Declaration of provenance in patent applications 
for marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdictions 
is a necessary condition for any monetary benefits to be 
shared. Non-monetary benefits must be supported by 
tangible, measurable aspects and overseen by regional 
stewardship.
10. Status and Content of Open-
Access
Open-access initiatives as part of the public goods 
framework are often offered up as a tangible benefit 
of scientific research and exploration, as in the Mare 
Geneticum  framework.37 There are at least three 
concerns here: first is the relationship between open 
access and any demands for embargoes or exclusivity. 
We can expect that during the embargo, much of the 
valuable information will be published, enclosed in a 
patent application or amount to commercially sensitive 
information that cannot be shared. A full open-access 
model would therefore be less meaningful if it competes 
with an embargo.
36 See calls for a new international model to make technology transfer in the context of the TRIPS Agreement Art 66.2 effective. M Shugurov, ‘TRIPS 
Agreement, International Technology Transfer and least Developed Countries’ Journal of Advocacy, Research and Education 2015 (2) Is. 1 74-85
37 Mare Geneticum n 1 above p 18
38 See M Maggiolino, ‘Standardised Terms and Conditions for Open Patenting’ 2003 (4) Minnesota J of Law, Science and Technology 785-816
Secondly, open-access can often be detrimental to 
the free availability of information because it does 
not prevent others from capturing openly available 
information in private databases or patents. The only 
way to prevent this would be to adopt a non-exclusive 
licensing model where the genetic resource is already 
under some property arrangement such as a patent and 
it is then made available for all to use, non-exclusively. 
This sort of arrangement is sometimes referred to as 
open-patenting. 38 In case of a merging of open-access 
and commercial genetic resources, it would be equitable 
for the commercial information to also become openly 
available rather than the reverse. This would be much 
more difficult to police, but could be done with political 
will and robust track and trace methods. 
Third, talk of open-access often misses a crucial element 
of transparency, and that is to consider the status of 
commercially sensitive information. Both commercial 
and academic entities are often reluctant to make 
available contractual information or licensing terms, 
choosing instead to cover them under the umbrella term 
of ‘commercially sensitive’. This is a particularly difficult 
barrier to overcome in the case of monetary benefits. 
Any open-access initiative should include not just 
genetic resources but also commercial and transactional 
information around that genetic resource, if benefits-
sharing is to be monitored and good practice built up. 
Resolve: There are many perils in the open-access 
model. The relationship with embargoes, patents and 
commercially sensitive information must be resolved. 
Open-access status of genetic resources, unless well 
defined, will remain difficult to police and liable to private 
acquisitions.
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